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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DIRECT IMPORT BUYERS' 
ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff -Appellant, 
K.S.L. , INC., 
Defendant-Respondent, 
Case No. 13966 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for slander and libel. The case is as 
stated in appellant's original brief. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted defendant's motion for summary 
judgment from which this appeal is taken. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the summary judgment and a 
remand of the case to the lower court for trial on the merits . 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 




Respondent contends that the case before the court should 
have, more properly, been characterized as a cause of action under 
"disparagement of good" or, more accurately speaking, an action in 
"injurious falsehood," Although such an action could have been brought 
under the facts of this case, it would not have been sufficiently broad to 
permit recovery for appellant's primary complaint; namely, that 
respondent's employee, Lynn Packer, suggests in his commentary that 
appellant may have been selling a product which was illegal under some 
state or federal antipollution law. Such an accusation is an attack on 
the person and not of the product, and the remedy is therefore an action 
in defamation and not injurious falsehood. 
Notwithstanding the reason for appellant's choice of causes 
of action, respondent's remedy is a motion to dismiss which should 
have been made in the lower court* Such a motion is not before the 
court on this appeal. Furthermore, even if this case had been brought 
under an injurious falsehood claim, the case would not have been proper 
for summary judgment since numerous factual questions remain to be 
-2~ 
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determined by the t r ie r of the facts . 
POINT I 
THE QUESTION OF TRUTH OR FALSITY OF 
THE STATEMENTS COMPLAINED OF IS A 
QUESTION FOR THE TRIER OF THE FACTS. 
There is little question that truth is a complete defense to 
defamationc The difficulty of respondent's position is that the question 
of the truth or falsity of the statements complained of by the appellant 
has not been determined by the t r ier of the facts . This question alone 
is sufficient to merit a trial of the i s sues . 
Under Point I of respondent's brief, respondent argues that 
Lynn Packer accurately stated the positions of his sources even if the 
sources1 information was not accurate, and therefore the respondent 
should be exonerated. Respondent overlooks the long established rule 
that the publication or repetition of defamation is itself actionable. The 
rule is clearly stated in Prosser, Law of Torts , Hornbook Series § 108, 
at 787 (3d ed. 1964): 
Every repetition of the defamation is a publication 
in itself, even though the repeater states the 
source, or resor t s to the customary newspaper 
evasion Mit is alleged," o r makes it c lear that he 
does not himself believe the imputation. The 
courts have said many times that the last u t ter -
ance may do no less harm than the first, and that 
the wrong of another cannot serve as an excuse 
to the defendant. Likewise every one who takes 
part in the publication, as in the case of the 
-3-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
owner, editor, printer, vendor, or even ca r r i e r 
of a newspaper is charged with publication, 
although so far as strict liability is concerned 
the responsibility of some of these has been 
somewhat relaxed. 
POINT II 
FAIR COMMENT ON A MATTER OF PUBLIC 
INTEREST, IN AND OF ITSELF, DOES NOT 
PROVIDE RESPONDENT WITH IMMUNITY OR 
PRIVILEGE. 
Respondent contends that the statements complained of were 
fair comment upon a matter of public interest and therefore privileged
 0 
This contention is not substantiated by either the Utah statutes or judicial 
decisions« Section 45-2-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953) defines the 
privileged publications. Fair comment on a matter of public interest is 
not one of the privileges provided by statute. 
In a recent decision, the United States Supreme Court 
refused to extend the privilege and immunity to mat ters of public interest 
where no public official o r public figure was involved. In Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 94 So Ct. 2997 (1974), the Supreme Court of the 
United States reviewed the question of privilege and immunity in a defa-
mation suit involving "a matter of public interest" where no public official 
or public figure was involved. The plaintiff was in fact a private indi-
vidual c The United States Supreme Court reversed its ear l ier decision 
relating to "matters of public interest" involving private individuals or 
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private plaintiffs which was enunciated in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 
Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) and held that the defendant was not protected 
by privilege or immunity in discussing "a matter of public issue" where 
a private plaintiff was involved. See also Brigham Young University Law 
Review, Volume I, at 159 thru 171 (1975). 
The citations submitted by the respondent under Point II begs 
the issue before the court and refers to matters which are considered 
privileged, true, or relating to public officials or public figures. As the 
appellant has stated previously in its initial brief on appeal, questions of 
privilege, truth, public figures or public officials are to be determined 
by the jury together with all other evidence. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT'S FIRST AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTI-
TUTION ARE NOT VIOLATED BY THE ACTION. 
The United States Supreme Court has reviewed the question 
of the First Amendment protection in three leading defamation suits. 
In each of these cases the Supreme Court has outlined the prerequisites 
for a successful suit taking into consideration the First Amendment of 
the United States Constitution. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Court set the standards for cases dealing with 
defamation of a public official. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 
U.S. 130 (1967), the United States Supreme Court set the standards for 
-5-
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prosecution of a defamation action involving public figures as distin-
guished from public officials0 In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. , 
supra, the privileges and immunities of the p ress were extended to cases 
involving "public i s sues . " However, in Gertz v . Robert Welch, Inc., 
supra, the United States Supreme Court reversed its position on cases 
involving "public i s sues . " Each of these cases dealt with the question 
of the F i rs t or Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and the question of freedom of the p r e s s . Under the guidelines set by 
the United States Supreme Court in the three leading cases cited, the 
freedom of the press was deemed to be adequately protected. 
POINT IV 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPERLY 
GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
The appellant has previously submitted its argument on why 
it believes that summary judgment was improper in the instant c a s e . In 
a brief outline form appellant believes that the following issues remain 
to be determined by the t r ie r of fact: 
1. Were the statements complained of true or false. 
2 . Did the defendant exercise reasonable care in deter-
mining the truth or falsity of the statements pub-
lished by the defendant as required by Section 
45-2-7, Utah Code Annotated, as amended (1953). 
3 c Did the defendant or its employee, Lynn Packer, 
maliciously publish false statements o r withhold 
information from the viewing public to distort 
-6 -
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the statements made and to intentionally 
injure the plaintiff, 
4. If any statements published by the defendant 
were false, is the defendant entitled to a 
claim of privilege or immunity for the false 
statements published. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant claims that the statements published by it are 
true and therefore not actionable. Questions of truth or falsity of a 
statement are to be determined by the trier of fact and should not have 
been determined by motion of summary judgment. Notwithstanding the 
fact that the comments made may have been of a matter of public interest, 
the United States Supreme Court in the Gertz decision has held that 
matters of public interest not involving a public official or a public figure 
do not provide immunity or privilege for false statements. The United 
States Supreme Court has further held that defamation suits, prosecuted 
under the guidelines of the Sullivan, Curtis, and Gertz decisions, do not 
violate the First Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and freedom of the press
 0 Since numerous issues of 
fact remain to be determined, summary judgment was not proper in this 
case; and appellant respectfully submits that the case should be remanded 
to the District Court of Salt Lake County for tr ial . 
Respectfully submitted, 
KENNETH M
 0 HiSATAKE 
Attorney for Appellant 
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